General Metaphysics / Worldviews

Broekaert, J. ''World Views. Elements of the Apostelian and General Approach." Foundations of Science 3 (1999) 1.

Choi, Hyung S. ''Dimension as a Way of Describing the Idea of Ultimate Reality in Contemporary Physics and Theology." Ultimate Reality and Meaning 19, 1 (1996) 50-68.

Craffert, P. F. ''The Stuff World-views Are Made Of." Scriptura: International Journal of Bible, Religion and Theology in Southern Africa 61.2 (1997) 193-212.

Craig, William Lane. ''Time and Infinity." International Philosophical Quarterly 31, 4 (1991) 387-401.
Three arguments for the impossibility of infinitely distant events are examined and defended in the light of critiques by Smith, Small, and others.

Deltete, Robert J. ''Is the Universe Self-caused?" Philosophy 75, 294 (2000) 599-603.
Analyzes and attacks Quentin Smith's "The Reason The Universe Exists is that it Caused Itself to Exist," a change from his earlier notion of an uncaused universe.

Hartnack, Justus. ''Analytic Philosophy and the Research on the Conceptualizations of an Ultimate Reality and Meaning of Human Existence." Ultimate Reality and Meaning 4, 2 (1981) 151-162.

Hiebert, Paul G. ''The Flaw of the Excluded Middle." Missiology: An International Review. 10, 1 January (1982) 35-47.

Horgan, John. ''Universal Truths." Scientific American 263, 4 (1990) 108.

Kvastad, Nils Bjorn. ''Pantheism and Mysticism." Sophia 14 (2), July (1975) 1-15.

Lehe, Robert T. ''Realism and Reality." Journal of Philosophical Research 23 (1998) 219-237.
Argues that there is a mind-independent world, which requires that it exists whether known or not and has a value independent of our concerns or values, meets objections from Putnam and Goodman.

Lowe, E. S. ''Form Without Matter." Ratio 11, 3 (1998) 214-234.
Identifies 3 concepts: (1) Matter as what a thing is immediately made of; (2) Matter as stuff of a certain kind; (3) Matter in the sense of an ultimate substratum. This last is associated with hylomorphism, with its necessarily embodied forms. But embodiment is not necessary to form.

Rescher, Nicholas. ''How Many Possible Worlds Are There?" Philosophy and Phenomenological Review 59, 2 (1999) 403-420.
Argues that the introduction of possible worlds is irrelevant because it is impossible to describe or to identify them.

Robbins, J. Wesley. ''Broken-backed Naturalism." Zygon. Journal of Religion and Science. 32, 4 (1997) 585-592.

Whitrow, G. J. ''On the Impossibility of an Infinite Past." British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 29 (1978) 39-45.

Whyte, J. T. ''Coherence and the Causation of Beliefs." Analysis 51, 4 (1991) 231-235.
Argues that the coherence conception of truth leads to impossible consequences. This world makes Absolute Idealism incoherent.